Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2014

Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy
Jedediah S. Purdy
Columbia Law School, jpurdy@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jedediah S. Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy, 77(4) LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 195 (2014).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3244

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu, rwitt@law.columbia.edu.

PURDY_FORMATTED_CHANTBOX_EIC (DO NOT DELETE)

12/3/2014 12:55 PM

NEOLIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM:
LOCHNERISM FOR A NEW ECONOMY
JEDEDIAH PURDY*
I
INTRODUCTION
Neoliberalism has a constitutional face. It figures in judicial and popular
interpretations of free speech, due process, equal protection, and federalism, as
surely as it does in intellectual property, family law, health policy, and the other
1
areas that our contributors address. In this article, I make the case that there is
something special about the constitutional expression of neoliberalism, which
arises from three features of constitutional law: its basicness, its breadth, and its
integrating tendency.
Constitutional neoliberalism is basic because it weaves neoliberal ideas into
some of the country’s most fundamental legal principles. Constitutional
doctrines of rights and structure both set out the elemental boundaries of
governance—what governments may and may not do—and tie these rudiments
of public power and constraint to orienting moral ideas: what interests and
capacities most matter in people, which collective purposes define the role of
government, and which constraints on government are essential to respecting
individuals. Constitutional neoliberalism is broad in that it touches many areas
of legal regulation, from state controls on pharmaceutical marketing to the
federal individual-insurance mandate to corporate campaign contributions. It is
integrating because the burden of principled constitutional decisionmaking is to
identify common stakes across these areas. Giving an account of liberty and
equality that integrates a variety of areas of regulation tends to produce,
however roughly and inconsistently, a moral image of the person as a
constitutional citizen. An account of federalism tends to produce such an image
of the levels and roles of government. And where a variety of constitutional
doctrines set limits on the regulation of economic life, they tend to produce a
moral image of the economy.
In particular, I argue that there is value in illuminating emerging
constitutional neoliberalism by comparison with the much-debated Lochner
Copyright © 2014 by Jedediah Purdy.
This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
* Robinson O. Everett Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
1. See Anne L. Alstott, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and Laissez-Faire
Markets in the Minimal State, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014 at 25; Robert Hockett,
Preliberal Autonomy and Postliberal Finance, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014 at 105; Amy
Kapczynski, Intellectual Property’s Leviathan, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014 at 131; Frank
Pasquale, The Hidden Costs of Health Care Cost-Cutting: Toward a Postneoliberal Health-Reform
Agenda, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014 at 171.
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era, the period when U.S. jurisprudence came closest to constitutionalizing
classical liberalism in economic matters. The comparison focuses attention on a
series of key issues, despite the obvious dangers of tendentious parallel-drawing
and hasty generalization that inhere in aligning distinct eras. These dangers are
worth specifying upfront, as they are sure to occur to thoughtful readers. One
danger has to do with the characterization of “constitutional eras,” in the past
or in one’s own time, which of course can obscure more than it reveals about
the messiness, diversity, and contestation within any moment of constitutional
law and politics, and about the continuity across “eras” of constitutional themes
and concerns. In other words, talk of eras can make the Constitution seem both
falsely whole at any moment and falsely fragmented across time.
The second danger lies in comparison, in which two interpretations, each
necessarily simplified, are set alongside each other for mutual illumination;
plainly, the effect could be to amplify distortion instead. That being said,
however, it is also true that in constitutional law, the whole is sometimes more
than the sum of its parts, and commentators need ways to acknowledge and
work with this fact. Constitutional law has epochs: between the mid 1950s and
the late 1960s, the Supreme Court of Chief Justice Earl Warren went to war
against Southern segregation, implemented a strong new voting-rights
jurisprudence, and revolutionized criminal law with a series of protections for
the accused. The individual cases of that time are part of a larger picture of the
Court’s role: to help create a certain kind of decent society by enforcing an
image of the legal and political meaning of equal citizenship in a democratic
polity. American society gathers this set of facts within the term “Warren
Court,” which critics and celebrators alike understand despite the many
necessary qualifications.
II
WHY CALL IT A NEW LOCHNERISM? WHAT THE COMPARISON SHOWS ABOUT
NEOLIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
The “Lochner era,” of course, refers to the Supreme Court’s desultory affair
with economic libertarianism, beginning in the late nineteenth century and
abruptly ending on or about March 29, 1937, with West Coast Hotel Co. v.
2
Parrish. In the namesake 1905 case, Lochner v. New York, the Supreme Court
3
invalidated a state law setting maximum daily and weekly hours for bakers.
The Court ruled that the law violated constitutionally protected “liberty of
contract,” the freedom of both employees and employers to make whatever
4
agreements they saw fit. Minimum-wage laws were another prime target of
Lochner reasoning because they forbade the contractual choice to accept low

2. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
3. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
4. Id. at 64.
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5

pay. The Court also invalidated laws that voided anti-union contracts to
6
7
advance organized labor, struck down price regulations, and, more
8
sympathetically, overturned barriers to entry in some trades and invalidated a
residential segregation law as a violation of the white seller’s right to transfer
9
his property as he liked. Between the 1880s and the 1930s, the Supreme Court
struck down more than 200 pieces of state and federal legislation as violations
of “economic liberty” and laissez-faire policy.
More specifically, the Lochner era provides a hindsight view—with the
partly artificial neatness of a completed episode—of what constitutional
jurisprudence can look like when it adopts a moralized view of economic life
that protects individual autonomy in market transactions.
First, key cases in the era take certain economic transactions as paradigms
of constitutional liberty and equality. Lochner itself embraces a picture of
liberty that centers on the contractual transactions of the autonomous
producer—the worker bargaining with a potential employer over the terms of
the labor contract. The same is true of cases dealing with wages, anti-union
contract terms, and other products of labor-market bargaining. The
paradigmatic constitutional citizen of these cases exercises the economic
autonomy of a buyer or seller of labor, of more traditional and literal real-estate
10
property or of the services of the craftsman or small businessman. This is the
substance of activity protected under both the liberty and equality clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment; as courts sometimes explain, equal freedom to
participate in these transactions places a person, at least potentially, within a
11
Horatio Alger–style life-course of acquisition and ownership.
There is a parallel in today’s neoliberal constitutionalism, which
concentrates on forms of autonomy that are more characteristic of twenty-first
century capitalism than that of a century ago: selling data, making consumption
decisions, and deciding how to spend money more generally to advance one’s
12
preferences. Even as the older model of economic constitutional liberty
5. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled by West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
6. E.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
7. E.g., Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
8. E.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
9. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
10. See id.; New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (invalidating a state law
prohibiting any person from manufacturing ice without first obtaining a certificate of convenience and
necessity); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
11. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, Address to the Wis. State Agric. Soc’y (Sept. 30, 1859) (arguing
that mobility and the openness of careers and property ownership made American economy uniquely
free and equal).
12. For examples, see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2584–91 (2012) (the
Sebelius reasoning on the Commerce Clause); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011); the
campaign-finance cases: Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) and
SpeechNow.org v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010); and the commercial-speech
cases: Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436
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remains largely exiled, as it has been since its rejection during the New Deal, a
new set of activities has formed a new version of economic constitutional
13
liberty, much of it anchored in the First Amendment.
III
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Today the principle that Congress “shall make no law . . . abridging the
14
freedom of speech” is perhaps the most familiar phrase in the Constitution,
and certainly one of the most iconic for liberals. Recently, though, it has
become a linchpin in the Supreme Court’s antiregulatory cases. Constitutional
protection of speech increasingly means protection of spending, advertising, and
even markets for the data that advertisers use to craft their messages. The Court
has overturned regulation in each of these areas in the name of free speech.
Lurking behind these doctrinal changes is an image of the world in which
politics and argument are practically the same as pursuing one’s preferences
through spending and seeking profit by advertising. This image assimilates to a
single constitutional status two kinds of activity that have traditionally received
very different levels of protection: classic political speech on the one hand and
market activities such as spending, marketing, and data-mining on the other.
The result has been to accord spending, marketing, and data-mining a level of
constitutional protection very near to that traditionally given to speech.
In the instantly infamous 2010 Citizens United decision, Justice Kennedy
applied these principles in full-throated fashion to strike down a ban on certain
15
corporate spending in elections. Justice Kennedy’s opinion embraced a pair of
principles that epitomize the First Amendment’s neoliberal version. First, limits
16
on spending count as limits on speech, so the power to write a million-dollar
check for a wave of last-minute advertising has about the same constitutional
status as the right to post a blog entry making the case for your candidate. This
spending-equals-speech equation was not new, only amplified: It dated back to
a 1976 case, Buckley v. Valeo, which overturned limits on individual spending as
17
unconstitutional speech restrictions.
Rather, the novelty of Citizens United lay in its announcement that
corporations’ political speech (read: spending) enjoys the same constitutional
18
protection as individuals’ speech. Taken together, the money-is-speech
U.S. 447 (1978).
13. See Timothy K. Kuhner, Consumer Sovereignty Trumps Popular Sovereignty: The Economic
Explanation for Arizona Free Enterprise v. Bennett, 46 IND. L. REV. 603, 631–32 (2013).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310.
16. Id. at 347–48, 354–55.
17. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see also Timothy K. Kuhner, The Democracy to Which We
Are Entitled: Human Rights and the Problem of Money in Politics, 26 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 73 (2013)
(explaining that in Buckley the Court also held that equality was, and thus still is, an unconstitutional
goal).
18. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340–43.
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principle and the extension of First Amendment protection to corporations
meant that for Congress to limit corporate campaign spending was just as
unconstitutional as banning a flesh-and-blood person from arguing for or
against health care reform. Justice Kennedy’s language was dire: “The
19
censorship we now confront is vast in its reach.” He warned, quoting an earlier
opinion by Justice Scalia, that “the Government has muffled the voices that best
20
represent the most significant segments of the economy.” The decision’s effect
on campaigns was immediate and dramatic: The advocacy group Public Citizen
reports that in the 2012 presidential election cycle, spending by newly
constitutionally empowered outside groups rose by 243 percent over the 2008
21
cycle.
Just a year later, Justice Kennedy wrote the Court’s opinion in Sorrell v.
22
IMS Health, the Vermont pharmaceutical decision. The backdrop of the case
was the enormous amount that drug companies spend marketing their products
to doctors and consumers—estimated at more than thirty billion dollars
annually in a 2008 study, which put marketing ahead of research and
23
development as a share of industry spending. Pharmacies and data-miners
serve drug marketers by selling them doctors’ prescription records, which the
24
marketers use to target their sales efforts. Vermont had barred the sale (or
giveaway) of prescription information and its use in marketing except where
25
physicians gave permission for their records to be used. The policy was meant
to protect doctors’ and patients’ privacy, and also to offset some of the market
power of the big drug companies, in the hope that more doctors would
26
prescribe less-expensive generic medicines.
Justice Kennedy wrote that the law was unconstitutional because it
burdened speech—marketing—based on the identity of the speaker (patentholding drug companies) and the content of the message (“prescribe our
27
drugs”). Kennedy described the issue as follows: “The State may not burden
the speech of others in order to tilt public debate in a preferred direction. ‘The
commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life,
28
provides a forum where ideas and information flourish.’” There is something
19. Id. at 354.
20. Id.; see also Kuhner, supra note 13, at 4 (explaining that a year after Citizens United the Court
continued on this trajectory in its decision in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett, which has allowed money in politics to reach “sufficiently towering heights”).
21. PUBLIC CITIZEN, FACT SHEET: CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC 210 (2013), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/students-citizens-united-guide-factsheet.pdf.
22. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
23. See York University, Big Pharma Spends More on Advertising than Research and
Development,
Study
Finds,
SCIENCE
DAILY
(Jan.
7,
2008),
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/01/080105140107.htm.
24. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2660.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 2661.
27. Id. at 2663.
28. Id. at 2671 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)).
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otherworldly about describing as “public debate” companies’ targeted pitches
to physicians. This constitutional peculiarity has two sources: one very much in
line with Citizens United, the other even stranger and more innovative.
The peculiarity that is in line with Citizens United is the Court’s growing
29
protection for businesses’ commercial speech. For more than three decades,
the Supreme Court has moved toward treating advertising as strongly protected
constitutional speech. Although the Court wrote in 1942 that “purely
30
commercial advertising” does not enjoy the First Amendment’s shield, in 1976
(the year of Buckley v. Valeo) the Justices reversed that doctrine in Virginia
State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia State Consumer Council. The Court struck
down a Virginia law that forbade pharmacists to advertise drug prices, which
was supposed to protect professionalism and discourage race-to-the-bottom
31
competition. The decision established that purely economic speech, such as
announcing low prices to potential customers, enjoys the protection of the First
32
Amendment. The Court reasoned that advertising conveys useful information
to consumers, which makes their decisions more efficient, and observed that a
listener’s interest in the price of medicine might be “as keen, if not keener by
33
far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.”
There is something reasonable in this formulation: The plaintiffs were
consumers, not marketers, and the Court observed that, with advertising
34
forbidden, drug prices varied widely around the state. At the same time,
however, this passage hints at very basic developments taking constitutional law
in a neoliberal direction. First, the passage imagines the subject of constitutional
rights not as a citizen engaged in political debate, but as a consumer worried
about prices. Of course people care about whether they can get medicine; but
the meaning of the doctrinal development is not that access to medicine is a
constitutional interest: it is that the consumer tracking prices, as much as the
citizen following debates, is exercising the liberty that the Constitution
enshrines.
Second, the doctrine addresses the human interest in getting essential
resources—medicine—or, more generically, fulfilling consumer preferences,
through a specific act of constitutional imagination: It treats the market as the
assumed vehicle for satisfying this interest. The First Amendment interest in
economic communication has an implied institutional context, the market,
which gives the First Amendment the function of making markets more closely
approximate the neoclassical ideal of perfect information. This development is
29. See Timothy K. Kuhner, Citizens United as Neoliberal Jurisprudence: The Resurgence of
Economic Theory, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 395, 398–401 (2011) (attributing this movement to
changes in Court membership which “have redefined democracy on the basis of this free market
approach to constitutional values”).
30. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
31. Va. State Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. State Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
32. Id. at 776.
33. Id. at 763.
34. Id. at 753–54.

PURDY_FORMATTED_CHANTBOX (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4 2014]

NEOLIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM

12/3/2014 12:55 PM

201

currently naturalizing the market through constitutional interpretation, as
surely as liberty-of-contract doctrine did during the Lochner era, but with a
35
focus on the consumer economy rather than the industrial labor market.
In Virginia State Pharmacy Board, only Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing
that, although the Court’s preferred policy might be sensible, there is no
36
constitutional interest in shielding advertising from regulation. In the decades
since, although the Court has tenuously maintained the formula that
commercial speech receives lesser protection than “core” political speech, it has
struck down limits on advertising for legal services, liquor stores, and tobacco
37
products. A certain amount of the everything-for-sale quality of American
public spaces owes directly to the Court’s protection of commercial speech. The
Justices have never said, though, that advertising deserves the same very strict
protection as political debate. Sorrell, the Vermont case, came as close as any to
dissolving any distinction between advertising and argument.
The stranger and more innovative aspect of Sorrell is that the case extended
First Amendment protection beyond anything recognizable as speech. Most of
what the decision protects is not verbal expression or even political spending
but simply the sale of data. Sorrell moved toward constitutionalizing an open
market in information, at least where the data informs marketing decisions and
where the regulation has different effects on different market actors. Just as the
right to speak first implied the right to spend and the right to argue implied a
right to advertise, now the rights to spend and advertise imply a right to buy and
sell the information that goes into marketing (which is itself robustly protected
as speech), so there is now a constitutionally protected interest in exchanging
information on the same terms as everyone else in the market. Any limit on
information markets, Kennedy reasoned in Sorrell, tilts the playing field in
favor of those who have more access to data—in Vermont’s case, generic drug
38
companies and public-health agencies.
As Justice Breyer pointed out in dissent, regulators control the form and
content of information transfer all the time, for instance, in guidelines for public
and shareholders’ communications by energy and financial companies,
restrictions on the uses pharmaceutical companies may recommend for their
drugs, and various controls on disclosure of patient information by doctors and
39
hospitals. Many of these regulations are specific to the content of the speech
and identity of the speaker, which was the constitutional problem with the
40
Vermont law. It would be simplistic to say that those regulations are on the
35. I thank David Grewal for helping me to appreciate this point.
36. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 781.
37. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (striking down a law that forbade
advertising tobacco near schools); Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (ban on
advertising liquor prices violates First Amendment); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977)
(law forbidding attorney advertising violates First Amendment).
38. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2670–72 (2011).
39. Id. at 2676.
40. Id. at 2677.
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chopping block, but the reasoning of Sorrell puts their constitutionality in
doubt. If nothing else, that reasoning creates a powerful and flexible tool for
limiting regulation of information markets and further amplifies the Court’s
solicitude for marketing as a core constitutional concern. For instance, post2008 financial regulations requiring disclosure of standard-form information for
certain financial products and services, or limiting the kinds of claims hedge
funds or mortgage providers can make to clients, could be subject to
constitutional challenge.
These changes in the First Amendment’s meaning put new intellectual
premises to work in constitutional law, premises not themselves implied by the
Constitution. For one, this neo-Lochnerism supposes that the distinction
between politics and markets, or principles and interests, is spurious: A
democratically adopted policy is just the aggregation of some people’s interests,
and a company’s economic interests make as worthy a basis for political
argument as any principle. For another, there is no publicly acceptable measure
of value except what people say they want and are willing to pay for:
preferences, that is, backed by cash. Any attempt to establish an independent
standard, such as fairness or cultural excellence, is elitist, parochial, or a try at
petty tyranny. For a third, markets are the best way by far of capturing and
maximizing this uniquely valid type of value. Therefore, elections and other
institutions should come to resemble markets as much as possible. The one
incontrovertibly valuable kind of freedom, then, is the freedom that makes
markets work. It is in this neoliberal, market-fixated climate that courts can
declare that spending is speech, advertisement is argument, and the transfer of
marketing data is a core concern of the First Amendment.
These ideas are to the present what classical laissez-faire and social
Darwinism were to the age of Lochner. As the rise of industrial capitalism and a
vast population of wage laborers made freedom of contract pervasively relevant
at the turn of the last century, today an economy built on consumption and
information makes the First Amendment a natural vehicle to constitutionalize
transactions at the core of the market. Much of what happens in the American
economy is some hybrid of marketing and information transfer. Products,
images, information, ideas, and advertising are increasingly aspects of a single
economic process. There was nothing comparable in 1905 to the perennial
marketing campaigns that make up a quarter of the pharmaceutical industry’s
spending, or the First Amendment–protected video game industry, the most
violent and interactive of a new kind of entertainment product that the First
Amendment secures from regulation.
For all these reasons, the First Amendment has helped the Supreme Court
to do for the consumer capitalism of the information age what freedom of
contract did for the industrial age: constitutionally protect certain transactions
that lie at the core of the economy. This makes unequal economic power much
harder for democratic lawmaking to reach, because there are only a few ways to
reduce the effect of economic inequality: redistribute wealth, guarantee certain
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goods (such as education or health care) regardless of wealth, and limit what
the wealthy can do with their money. Constitutional protection of marketing
and spending takes the last option off the table at a time when the other two are
politically embattled. Whether in elections or in marketing and the vast data
economy behind it, the market itself, with all its inequality, is ever more
thoroughly constitutionalized as a realm of freedom.
This development is a milestone in the Court’s march away from a principle
that it accepted with the New Deal: Buying and selling enjoy no special
constitutional status, and legislatures can regulate markets and businesses to
make life more equitable, safe, or healthful. Now, when these policy decisions
are interpreted as implicating the First Amendment, the wealthy interests
burdened by social and economic legislation can appeal from the political
process to the Supreme Court, delaying regulation and raising its costs, and
sometimes they win, sending lawmakers back to the start of an often-fractious
41
process. Moreover, these cases give wealthy interests a rhetorical leg up: they
can denounce regulation as “censorship” with the Supreme Court and the
42
neoliberal Constitution behind them.
IV
RIGHTS AND STRUCTURE
The second contribution of the Lochner-era comparison is to cast light on
the connection between the jurisprudence of constitutional rights and that of
constitutional structure, particularly federalism. Although these are, formally
speaking, distinct principles, it is not accidental that the same Lochner-era
courts that invalidated state economic regulations on equal-protection and dueprocess grounds also overturned federal economic regulations as exceeding the
43
Constitution’s grant of power in the Commerce Clause. Nor is the link as bare
and inarticulate as the fact that both kinds of rulings had the concrete effect of
44
enabling employers to pay lower wages, hire child workers, and so forth.
Rather, the areas of social life exempted from federal regulation were
associated with specific values, the same that were protected by Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence. So Justice Day wrote in 1918 that if Congress can

41. See Tim Wu, The Right to Evade Regulation: How Corporations Hijacked the First
Amendment, NEW REPUBLIC (June 3, 2013) http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113294/howcorporations-hijacked-first-amendment-evade-regulation (giving examples of recent First Amendment
challenges to securities laws, anti-corruption laws, and food-labeling regulations).
42. See also Kuhner, supra note 29, at 409 (“The Court’s theoretical view is tenable, however, and,
upon reflection, clear: speech occurs within a marketplace and that marketplace must remain as free as
possible, limited only by the need to prevent quid pro quo corruption.”).
43. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
44. See Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 43 U.S. 394 (1923) (holding federal minimum wage for
women and children violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment), overruled by West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Hammer, 247 U.S. 251 (holding federal child labor laws
as outside Congress’s Commerce Clause power).
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forbid interstate shipment of goods produced in factories where children under
fourteen were employed or children under sixteen worked more than eight
45
hours a day, “all freedom of commerce will be at an end.” The idealization of a
certain version of laissez-faire economic relations as “freedom of commerce”
lent charisma and cogency to both lines of cases.
The parallel today is evident in the arguments against the 2010 Affordable
Care Act’s (ACA’s) individual insurance–purchase mandate that persuaded
five Justices that the mandate exceeded Congress’s power to regulate interstate
46
commerce. Formally speaking, the judgment made in Sebelius was purely
structural, based in the extent of the Article I, Section 8 grant of legislative
47
power to Congress. However, near the heart of the Justices’ opinions rejecting
the commerce power basis for the individual mandate is the idea that the
Constitution protects, even indirectly, the autonomy of the consumer deciding
48
how to spend her money. The moral and political gravamen of the structural
argument, that is, captured the present mood of laissez-faire for consumer
capitalism, as Justice Day’s warning about the end of “freedom of commerce”
49
did a century ago for the industrial economy.
The strangeness of the ACA ruling lies precisely in its use of a structural
federalism argument to protect a substantive individual right. In legislating,
Congress always faces two kinds of constitutional constraints: Some
Congressional actions are forbidden by rights-protecting language such as the
First Amendment while others, though not prohibited, lack authorization in the
Constitution’s enumeration of Congress’s powers. The five Justices who found
that the Commerce Clause cannot support the individual mandate relied, of
course, on the latter kind of constraint.
The Court has given a famously broad interpretation of the power “to
50
regulate commerce . . . among the several states” since the New Deal cases
overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart and turned decisively away from other cases
51
striking down federal economic regulation, such as Carter v. Carter Coal.
Upholding the federal ban on home production of medical marijuana for
personal use in the 2005 case of Gonzales v. Raich is only one recent,
52
touchstone instance. In Gonzales, the Justices reasoned that, although the
medical marijuana in question was not intended to leave the state or enter any
commercial flow, it might find its way into the market for illegal drugs, and so
prohibiting it was an integral part of a broader federal scheme of regulating (by
45. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 276.
46. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
47. Id. at 2578–80, 2585–93.
48. See Bryan J. Leitch, Where Law Meets Politics: Freedom of Contract, Federalism, and the Fight
Over Health Care, 27 J.L. & POL. 177 (making this argument with extensive supporting detail and
interpretation).
49. See Hammer, 247 U.S. at 276.
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
52. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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prohibition) interstate traffic in marijuana.
But in Sebelius, five Justices held that the Commerce Clause does not
authorize Congress to require individuals to make purchases in a field of
54
economic life that they have not already voluntarily joined. Decide to become
a farmer, the argument goes, and one may be subject to all kinds of regulations,
55
quotas, and so forth. The initial choice to enter the field means taking on its
regulatory burdens. But a passive citizen, just by being, has done nothing to
56
subject herself to the insurance mandate. Once she enters the field of health
care consumption, the Justices conceded, she can be required to buy insurance;
57
but as long as, like Winnie-the-Pooh, she just is, Congress cannot reach her.
This argument is strange because, although it formally addresses the limits
of federal power, its rhetorical, moral, and political force comes from its appeal
to the autonomy of the consumer and warnings that a runaway Congress might
violate that autonomy. Lower federal courts overturning the individual
mandate invariably invoked dark fantasies of a paternalistic government
requiring citizens to buy American cars, health-club memberships, or
58
vegetables. The same dire warnings appeared in several of the Justices’
Sebelius opinions. The odd thing about this parade of nanny-state horribles is
that, because the Commerce Clause concerns the powers of Congress, not the
rights of individuals, a ruling that invalidates the individual mandate under the
Commerce Clause simply means that only state governments, not the federal
government, can pass such a law. Massachusetts had done just that in a piece of
59
legislation that served as a template for the ACA.
Under modern doctrine, there is no such thing as an important,
constitutionally protected personal liberty that a state can violate but the
federal government cannot, or vice-versa. The Constitution protects individual
rights against all government action, regardless of the source (with a handful of
minor exceptions that are not relevant here). By and large, any personal right
protected under the Bill of Rights is applied against the states via incorporation
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the limitations
that the Equal Protection Clause imposes on the states are enforced against the
federal government by judicial interpretation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due
60
Process clause as including an equal-protection component. The Commerce
Clause governs federal but not state power because it is not a rights-protecting

53. Id. at 17–22.
54. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586–87 (2012).
55. Id. at 2587–88.
56. Id. at 2590.
57. See BENJAMIN HOFF, THE TAO OF POOH (1982) (using A.A. Milne characters to illustrate a
version of Taoist thought and practice). The quote comes from the famous summary on the back cover:
“While Eeyore frets and Piglet hesitates and Rabbit calculates and Owl pontificates, Pooh just is.”
58. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256,
1289 (2011).
59. 2006 Mass. Acts 77–158.
60. Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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clause; yet Sebelius and lower-court rulings proceeded as if they were
vindicating a constitutional right of consumer liberty.
The irony is particularly acute because the modern constitutional era is
marked by rejection, since 1937, of the idea that the Constitution secures
61
personal rights of negative economic liberty. Justice Day in Hammer v.
Dagenhart at least referred to a then-recognized constitutional liberty when he
62
moved to protect “freedom of commerce” through the Commerce Clause.
Although structural doctrines and rights-protecting doctrines are formally
distinct, the very fact that it seems anomalous to allow states to intrude on
rights that the federal government may not, or vice-versa (the intuition driving
the incorporation and reverse-incorporation doctrines merging the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments) lends some plausibility to interpretation in the style
of Justice Day, which can seem an early effort to merge rights against federal
and state regulation into a coherent web. Because the decisive post-1937
rejection of the idea that the Constitution protects negative economic liberties
remains in effect, there is no similar hope of doctrinal coherence in the
Commerce Clause reasoning of Sebelius.
There is, however, an ideological coherence: the commitment to an idea of
negative economic liberty as a touchstone personal freedom, an idea embedded
in an idealized image of a market economy, lends impetus to the thought that
the Constitution should protect the passive consumer in her Bartleby-like
choice to decline health insurance. We can see in hindsight that the Lochner
era’s antiregulatory cases constitutionalized a laissez-faire picture of the
economy precisely because they reached beyond the liberty-of-contract doctrine
that decided Lochner itself and shaped other areas, including structural issues
not formally concerned with direct protection of personal rights. In so doing,
the cases of the Lochner era enforced a constitutional line that in many
instances protected unequal bargaining power in the private economy from
interference by government regulation. Similarly, the limit on federal power
that the Sebelius Court announced complements the First Amendment cases’
protection of buying, selling, and marketing in a single, nascent conception of
economic liberty.
A second telling development in structural doctrine is the limitation on
Congress’s spending power announced in Sebelius. On this issue, seven Justices
ruled that the Affordable Care Act’s provision withdrawing existing Medicaid
federal funding from states that declined to expand the program as the ACA
63
directed amounted to unconstitutional coercion of state governments. In a
64
reminder that the appeal of neoliberal jurisprudence is not restricted to the

61. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“The Constitution does not speak
of freedom of contract.”).
62. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918).
63. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603–05, 2660–62 (2012) (plurality
and dissenting opinions).
64. Neoliberal jurisprudence is defined as “the use of neoclassical economic theory as judicial
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right-hand side of a Court divided along partisan lines, Justice Roberts’s
plurality opinion attracted the votes of Justices Breyer and Kagan. The heart of
the plurality opinion’s reasoning was that the formally separate character of the
earlier Medicaid statutes and the ACA, in addition to the amount of federal
money at stake, marked the ACA’s conditional Medicaid grants as “coercion”
65
rather than as an offer that the states were free to accept or refuse.
Justice Scalia’s discussion of the issue, joined by Justice Kennedy, Alito, and
Thomas, reveals the concrete stakes of this rather formalistic claim. Justice
Scalia argued that the ACA’s conditional spending, if permitted, would greatly
raise the cost to states of opting out of federal social programs because the
states’ residents would be required to pay the taxes that fund those programs,
regardless of whether they were to accept the conditional grants that would
66
return the same money to the states. State residents would also need to pay
taxes to support any alternative approach to the same social program—a state
version of low-income medical support that does not fit the requirements of the
67
ACA, for instance. This double payment would sharply limit effective state
autonomy in policymaking, bringing the ACA’s conditional spending
intolerably close to the Congressional commandeering of state legislatures that
68
the Court has elsewhere rejected on federalism grounds.
The functional meaning of this decision is that Congress faces a major
constitutional barrier to its long-preferred way of imposing national settlements
on basic questions of social policy. In this functional sense, the Medicaidexpansion decision is aligned with pre–New Deal Commerce Clause cases,
notably Hammer v. Dagenhart, that also found in state autonomy a limit on
Congress’s power to shape a national economy according to a unifying set of
ethical imperatives: there, no child labor; here, significant public subsidy of
health care for low-income individuals and families. In the area of social
benefits, such settlements tend, of course, to have major distributive
consequences.
The Court’s interpretation of the spending power as limiting Congress’s
distributive power in the interest of state autonomy also produces another and
arguably more peculiar alignment for Sebelius: one with Pollock v. Farmers’
Loan & Trust Co., the 1895 decision holding that a federal income tax violated
a constitutional requirement that the burdens of “direct taxes” be apportioned
69
according to state population. The requirement blocks national majorities
from ganging up on states composed of an electoral minority to impose unequal
tax burdens. Although the Wilson–Gorman Tariff Act of 1894, invalidated by

reasoning.” Kuhner, supra note 29, at 397.
65. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (Roberts, J., plurality opinion).
66. Id. at 2661–62 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2661–64 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a discussion on commandeering, see New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174–81 (1992).
69. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
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Pollock, imposed no disproportionate tax burden, that it did not formally
allocate the tax burden according to state population gave a five-Justice
majority a hook to rule for the plaintiffs who had argued, as Justice Harlan
recounted in his dissent, that “this income tax was an assault by the poor upon
the rich,” and that the Court must “stand in the breach for the protection of the
70
just rights of property against the advancing hosts of socialism.” In both
Sebelius and Pollock, the Court used the specter of redistribution among the
states to limit Congress’s authority to impose a national settlement on basic
distributive questions concerning how the benefits and burdens of economic life
are shared.
V
THE LIMITS OF THE SAYABLE: WHERE IS THE WALL?
In an effort to rehabilitate the doctrine and worldview of Lochner, a set of
libertarian constitutional theorists have made a rhetorically convenient, if
conceptually awkward, two-part case that (1) the doctrines of the era were more
benign and defensible than they have been portrayed as being in the
conventional hindsight story; and (2) in any case, those doctrines received
inconsistent application that never hardened into a constitutional rule against
71
redistribution. The second part of the defense, that the Lochner era never
really generated a set of clear and consistently enforced rules, is a red herring,
and understanding why reveals a third benefit of thinking about the present
moment in light of the Lochner era.
During the Lochner era, the significance of liberty-of-contract and
antiregulatory federalism doctrines was not that they became a hard-and-fast
set of rules, but that they created, used, and, in so doing, expanded a set of
available constitutional arguments. As Jack Balkin has argued, the era, like
others, was marked not so much by hard lines and fixed points of doctrine as by
what kinds of constitutional arguments were unsayable, or “off-the-wall,” and
72
what kinds were available for use and innovation. The arguments offered by
litigants challenging regulation in cases such as Hammer v. Dagenhart show that
it was entirely possible to advance a consistent theory of a laissez-faire
Constitution, based on case language and principles distilled from that
language, and that members of the Supreme Court Bar regarded that strategy
as their best gambit in many cases—including some that they won on variations
73
of those principles.
To illuminate the importance of this possibility, it may be helpful to
compare it to a pair of familiar positions in the constitutional jurisprudence of
the early twenty-first century: the vision of the Equal Protection Clause as
70. Id. at 674 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
71. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 1–22 (2011).
72. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION 174–84 (2011).
73. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 266–68 (1918).
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enforcing a “color-blind Constitution,” which has at least four adherents based
on the Court’s opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
74
School District, and the view that some combination of the Equal Protection
75
and Due Process clauses supplies a right to same-sex marriage. Neither is the
law of the land. Both have made their way “onto the wall,” the marriageequality position in the last decade, the color-blind view over several decades.
These arguments’ becoming “sayable” has three kinds of consequences: The
availability of these arguments imposes (1) costs in litigation, (2) caution in
drafting, and (3) general uncertainty on those who support, design, and
implement the policies that the novel arguments call into question. These
arguments also hold open the possibility of further constitutional development
in the directions they mark out: as long as these doors are not closed, future
Courts might go through them and keep walking. The post-1937 rejection of the
Lochner era was a Carthaginian peace: the New Deal Justices ploughed salt into
76
the fields of Lochner and made its name anathema for decades.
Without such unconditional defeat, a whole series of advances remains
possible with just one or two Supreme Court appointments or a single
watershed case. In their most diffuse effect, but with great consequence, these
doctrines enable activists and innovators both inside and outside of litigation to
make claims on the Constitution that put their preferred positions outside
77
ordinary political debate. They create, in other words, pathways for turning
activism and movement commitment into constitutional law—one of the more
potent and mysterious achievements possible in U.S. politics.
The same is true of the new set of antiregulatory doctrines. They entangle
classically legislative action, such as the design and passage of the Affordable
Care Act, in prolonged constitutional litigation and create uncertainty and
drafting anxiety around advertising restrictions, disclosure requirements, and
regulation of the digital economy. They make possible the alchemy of political
disagreement into disputes over constitutive national principle that is the
hallmark of constitutional politics. For one salient example, they have enabled
the Tea Party’s mistrust of Barack Obama’s presidency and of federal
regulation generally to flow into constitutional form in the Commerce Clause

74. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
75. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (invalidating portions of the Defense of
Marriage Act on equal protection grounds); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014)
(invalidating Virginia’s ban on same-sex marriage under due-process strict scrutiny); Kitchen v.
Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014) (invalidating Utah’s ban on same sex marriage).
76. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937) (“What is this freedom? The
Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.”). Thereafter, substantive due process was long an
accusation—a self-evidently bad form of reasoning that Justices accused one another of falling into.
See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 675–76 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting)
(accusing majority of “using the old ‘natural-law-due-process formula’ to justify striking down state
laws”).
77. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living
Constitutionalism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006) (on popular constitutionalism).

PURDY_FORMATTED_CHANTBOX (DO NOT DELETE)

210

12/3/2014 12:55 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 77:195

78

argument against the individual mandate.
At first, that argument struck most serious constitutional commentators as a
79
blend of perversely contrarian academic exercise and know-nothing populism.
What it had become by the time five Justices adopted it—a serious piece of
constitutional argumentation—was as much a diagnostic symptom of a
neoliberal moment as it was an achievement of anyone involved in the
litigation. Even more markedly than ordinary women and men, constitutional
jurists must make history under circumstances that they do not choose. Both the
Lochner era and the present moment come into focus partly when considered in
light of the history that they enable jurists to make.
Part of the reason that neoliberal doctrines enjoyed relatively quick
ascendancy is that the post-1937 repudiation of the Lochner era was never as
complete or as deep as it seemed in the scornful hindsight of mid-century
Supreme Court opinions. This is true in at least two respects. First, although
certain specific doctrines were set aside in 1937, there was no successful move to
constitutionalize the New Deal settlement. A brief move in the direction of
constitutional guarantees of minimum social benefits and equal protection
scrutiny of policies that ill-served the poor, such as inequitable public-school
funding tied to property taxes, collapsed between 1970 and 1973, leaving such
80
policies almost entirely to legislative discretion. Judicial language about the
importance of education, food, and shelter to civic functioning and expressions
of constitutional suspicion toward laws that burdened the poor were quickly set
aside.
Second, the social base of laissez-faire politics never went away in the
United States; as David Grewal and I have argued, a historically unusual level
of prosperity allowed shared wealth and social peace for a time between
81
business and labor. However, an enduring substrate of opposition to the New
Deal and the Great Society persisted both in demotic political culture and
82
among economic elites. The Carthaginian peace that buried Lochner was
78. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Popular Originalism? The Tea Party Movement and Constitutional
Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 483 (2012) (on the Tea Party’s influence on constitutional interpretation);
Zietlow, Democratic Constitutionalism and the Affordable Care Act, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367 (2011)
(setting out in greater detail the role of Tea Party movement in developing arguments against the
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act).
79. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Radical Constitutionalism, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE at MM34, Nov. 28,
2010 (observing that arguments against the Affordable Care Act seemed “far-fetched only a year ago”
but were likely to gain traction from Tea Party political influence).
80. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (financing public school
districts through property taxes is not unconstitutional discrimination against students living in poor
neighborhoods); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (a cap on welfare grants regardless of
family size and need is not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969) (statutory prohibition of welfare assistance to residents of less than a year is unconstitutional
discrimination); cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (a statute preventing school districts from
admitting undocumented students violates the Equal Protection Clause).
81. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014 at 1.
82. See ANGUS BURGIN, THE GREAT PERSUASION: REINVENTING FREE MARKETS SINCE THE
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rather more doctrinally specific, and more restricted to an elite professional
culture, than several generations of law students, lawyers, and judges might
83
have recognized. For both reasons, neoliberal constitutionalism could develop
once the long crisis of the post–World War II settlement set in and certain
economic interests began to align with freedom to advertise, spend, sell, and so
forth.
VI
FREEDOM IN THE NEOLIBERAL CONSTITUTION
Lochner-era judges did not simply ride to the aid of factory owners against
workers and labor-friendly legislatures. They were idealistic in their own way.
Their open-market principles developed from the democratic and antislavery
legacy of the earlier nineteenth century: Jacksonian attacks on monopolies and
other forms of legally enshrined economic privilege, the Republican and
Abolitionist war on slavery, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of equal
84
citizenship for all Americans. In effect, the Court, along with much of the
country, sometimes reasoned as if the principle of equal freedom, the rejection
of slavery, and economic special privilege amounted to an equal right to win or
85
lose in the marketplace. So, with decades of struggle for equal freedom and
civic dignity at its back, the Lochner-era Court struck down minimum wages,
maximum hours, income taxes, rate regulation, and laws protecting labor
unions.
The early twenty-first century, too, follows an era of struggle for equal
freedom that has fallen into uncertainty and conflict over the meaning of its
emancipating achievement. In the modern instance, the backdrop is the Civil
Rights era and expansion of individual liberty that earlier Supreme Courts did

DEPRESSION 12–54 (2012) (discussion of reception of Hayek in United States upon the publication of
his book, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM); RICK PERLSTEIN, BEFORE THE STORM: BARRY GOLDWATER
AND THE UNMAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSENSUS (2001) 3–17, 43–60, 120–40 (on the social and
ideological basis of the U.S. pro-market right in the twentieth century); Memorandum from Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman, Educ. Comm., U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23,
1971),
available
at
http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Powell%20Archives/
PowellMemorandumTypescript.pdf.
83. This is, of course, the argument usefully made in this issue by David Bernstein and Ilya Somin,
who propose both that the jurisprudence of the Lochner era is less remote from what followed than is
often imagined and that its distinctive features are now experiencing a revival in what they call
libertarian constitutionalism. David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, The Mainstreaming of Libertarian
Constitutionalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014 at 43.
84. See JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY 87–109 (2010) (discussing origins,
competing versions, and difficulties of free-labor thought).
85. Justice Brewer gave especially vivid expression to this idea in an 1893 address to the New York
State Bar Association. See David J. Brewer, The Nation’s Safeguard, 16 PROC. N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N 37, 39
(“It is the unvarying law, that the wealth of a community will be in the hands of a few . . . ”); id. at 46
(“Who does not hear the old demagogic cry . . . ‘the majority are always right’ . . . invoked to justify
disregard of those guaranties . . . [of] protection to private property?”); id. at 47 (warning against
“anarchism,” “barbarism,” “socialism,” and the prospect that “the State [will] take all property and
direct all the life and work of individuals as if they were little children”).
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much to articulate and enforce. The same Justices who are driving the new
antiregulatory decisions also have a view about the meaning of that twentieth86
century legacy, above all Brown v. Board of Education, the touchstone of the
Civil Rights revolution. In cases challenging affirmative action in higher
education and race-conscious school-placement plans in public schools, the
Justices have argued that Brown establishes a color-blind Constitution, and that
when the government classifies students for the purposes of different
treatment—where to admit them to school, for instance—it strikes at the dignity
87
of citizenship.
This view is idealistic, in its way. It insists on the autonomy of self-defining
individuals, whose identities and relationships are their own to form, and may
not be dictated, let alone marked as more or less worthy, by the hand of a
supervisory state. But idealistic or not, in a world where racial stratification
remains pervasive and tracks economic and educational inequality, this form of
constitutional individualism can also be terribly unrealistic, even intellectually
88
dishonest. As with differences in economic power, when the government
closes its eyes to a real problem, it may only prevent itself from doing
something about it. This position comes very close to “solving” the multifarious
issue of race by leaving it up to millions of dispersed individuals to figure out.
As Justice Kennedy wrote in Parents Involved, “Under our Constitution the
individual, child or adult, can find his own identity, can define her own persona,
without state intervention that classifies on the basis of his race or the color of
89
her skin.”
If there is a neoliberal approach to race, this is it: respectful of a certain kind
of individual choice, wary of government attempts to engineer the system, and
mainly blind to the ways that inequality persists and makes race real in practice,
even as the Supreme Court works to make it irrelevant in principle. Like the old
Lochnerism, today’s new antiregulatory doctrines echo a sweeping view of the
country’s situation and the meaning of its core ideals, a view that cuts across
fields of social life and areas of constitutional doctrine.
This point highlights a pair of parallels between the Lochner era and this
neoliberal time, with import for understanding the role of conceptions of
personal autonomy in normative views of political economy. First, any strong
conception of negative autonomy—a right to refuse mandatory economic
relations such as slavery or indenture in the first Lochner era, and a right to be

86. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
87. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 742–43, 746–48,
797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“To be forced to live under a state-mandated racial label is
inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society”); Pamela S. Karlan, Lecture: What Can
Brown Do for You?: Neutral Principles and the Struggle Over the Equal Protection Clause, 58 DUKE
L.J. 1049, 1063–66 (2009).
88. See DARIA ROITHMAYR, REPRODUCING RACISM: HOW EVERYDAY CHOICES LOCK IN
WHITE ADVANTAGE 108–20 (2014) (on how whites’ economic advantage has become “locked in[to]”
the economy in such a way that it persists without any intentional racial discrimination).
89. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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free of mandatory gender and racial identities and roles in the current era of
constitutional individualism—has certain consequences that, unless one is a
defender of the substance of those hierarchies, are undeniably emancipating.
The attractiveness and importance of rights enforcing such conceptions of
autonomy lie in the fact that they break people out of mandatory, hierarchical
roles.
The second point is that, with this emancipation achieved, the question
becomes what are people emancipated into? What kind of political economy,
what kinds of social relations, and what distribution of benefits and burdens
follow emancipation? The danger of negative conceptions of autonomy is that it
is tempting, and ideologically convenient for some positions, to pretend that
they are not only necessary to achieve any worthwhile modern form of freedom,
but sufficient to that goal. Then they become means to rationalize and insulate
structurally produced inequality as being simply the product of fair relations
among equally free individuals. That is the temptation and danger of neoliberal
Lochnerism.
What will become of all of this depends, at the simplest level, on the
outcome of the next presidential election and the next few Supreme Court
appointments. In a more complex way, it depends on the quality of politics and
public life. The Constitution is what Americans make it. Constitutional law is
unlikely to produce a better version of its core principles, freedom and equality,
than America’s social movements and political leaders confidently voice and
pursue. For a few decades in the twentieth century, regulating the economy to
make personal freedom and security a reality was a goal shared between
Democrats and Republicans, big business and labor. Earlier, however, it was a
fraught idea, denounced as socialism or fascism, and it became consensual only
after the crisis of the Depression and the decades-long efforts of the labor
movement and progressive critics of laissez-faire. If Americans do not
reestablish ideals of equality and personal liberty that take account of vast
social and economic inequality and give government a strong role in addressing
it, the United States will get the Constitution, and the country, it has earned.

